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(b) where a corporation carries on business through an employee who
has general authority to contract for his employer or principal or
has a stock of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders which
he receives, the said agent or employee shall be deemed to operate a
permanent establishment of the corporation.
(2) The use of substantial machinery or equipment in a particular place
at any time in a taxation year shall constitute a permanent establish-
ment in that place for the year.
The Supreme Court held that the company did not have a per-
manent establishment in Quebec, as it had no fixed place of business
there. The representative's office was not a branch office or agency of
the company. The representative could not complete contracts or fill
orders, merely forwarded orders to the Ontario plant. The representa-
tive's equipment for demonstration purposes was not considered to be
"substantial." Hence the company's allegation failed.
In M.N.R. v. Hollinger North, Shore Exploration Co. Ltd.16 the
Income Tax Act s. 83(5) exemption for "income derived from the
operation of a mine" for 36 months after production commences was
at issue. The Minister assessed the royalties received by the company
from sub-leasing the mine. The Supreme Court held that this income
was income "derived" from a mining operation hence exempt under
s. 83(5). "Derived" is not limited to "received", it also includes
"arising" or "accruing." R.F.E.
N. TORTS
Ouelefte v. Johnson; Ouelette v. Tourigny, [1963] S.C.R. 96.
By its dismissal of the appeal in the recent case of Ouelette v.
Johnson,1 the Supreme Court of Canada has exhibited its sympathy
with the Ontario courts and their attempt to narrow the operation
of subsection 105(2) of The Highway Traffic Act.2 The facts of the
case were as follows: the appellant-defendant Ouelette and the two
plaintiffs, Johnson and Kennefic all worked at the Consolidated Deni-
16 [1963] S.C.R. 131.
1 [19631 S.C.R. 96. In point of fact, there were two cases before the bar
namely Lionel Ouelette v. John Johnson and Lionel Ouelette and Ferrier
Turcotte v. Gladys Tourigny and Terry Tourigny infants under the age of 21
years by their next friend Hazel Agnes Kennefic and the said Hazel Agnes
Kennefic.2 R.S.O., 1960, c. 172, s. 105: (i) The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for
loss or damage sustained by any person by reason of negligence in the opera-
tion of the motor vehicle on the highway unless the motor vehicle was with-
out the owner's consent in possession of some person other than the owner
or his chauffeur, and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner Is
liable to the same extent as the owner. (ii) Notwithstanding subsection 1, the
owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in business
of carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in,
or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle.
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son Mine near Elliot Lake, Ontario, and commuted to their homes in
Sudbury each weekend. The defendant, a car owner, agreed to drive
the other two for a fixed fee of $2.00 each per one-way trip between
the mine and Sudbury. This rate was not based on the cost of gas
or oil but corresponded exactly to the amount which the plaintiff
Johnson had paid to a previous driver. Several such journeys were
made pursuant to the agreement until a collision occurred in which
Kennefic was killed and Johnson was seriously injured.
The trial judge, Aylen, J.3 in two judgments held that the
accident resulted solely from the defendant's negligence and that
his automobile was being "operated in the business of carrying pas-
sengers for compensation" within the ambit of subsection 105(2).4
He implicitly affirmed the case of Wing v. Banks5 and accordingly
gave judgment for the plaintiffs.6 Almost a year later, the Ontario
Court of Appeal dismissed without reported reasons, appeals from
the two judgments.7 In the Supreme Court, no question was raised as
to the trial judge's finding of negligence or the assessment of damages.
The judgment was delivered by Cartwright J. who held that decisions
in Wing v. Banks and Lemieux v. Bedards were correct and legally
indistinguishable from the instant case. Although it appears from
the report that counsel on both sides cited numerous cases relating
to subsection 105 (2), the Court unfortunately did not think it neces-
sary to examine them in detail and rationalize the conflicts. The only
case which they chose to disapprove explicitly was Cseki v. Dixon.9
There the amount of the fixed fee agreed to be paid by the plaintiff
was a proportion of a reasonable estimate of the cost of gas and oil,
and the Court refused to believe that once it has been determined that
an arrangement is of a "commercial nature" the manner of deciding
upon the amount of the fee should be relevant.' 0
It is submitted that this case in no way represents a departure
from the previous law. Indeed, on the basis of Wing v. Banks, the
Court certainly arrived at the logical conclusion. In that case, at trial,
Gale 3. clearly stated that for the purposes of section 105, a vehicle
need not be a common carrier or devoted exclusively to the business
3The judgment was unreported, however a copy can be obtained from
the Supreme Court Office, 1961 #130 under the style Johnson v. Ouelette.
4At p. 13 Aylen J. stated "consideration of the above decisions has
convinced me that when, as in this case, a fixed fee is paid for transporta-
tion regardless of the number of passengers in the car and that fee is in no
way based on sharing of expenses, the driver of the car is, at least for the
time being 'in the business of carrying passengers for hire'."
5 [1947] O.W.N. 897 (C.A.).
6The cases referred to in argument were Csehi v. Dixon [1953] O.W.N.
238, Demianiw v. Zinkewicvh [1953] O.W.N. 121, Wing v. Banks [1947] O.W.N.
897, Lemieux v. Bedard [1953] O.R. 836, Regan v. Edgill [19561 O.W.N. 801 and
Bohm v. Maurer [19571 O.W.N. 381.7 Upon inquiry at the Court of Appeal Office, the writer was informed that
the appeal was dismissed without recorded reasons.
8 [1953] O.R. 837, (1953) 4 D.L.R. 252 affirming [1952] O.R. 500, (1952)
4 D.L.R. 421.
9 [1953] O.W.N. 238, (1953) 2 D.L.R. 202 (C.A.).
lo Bupra, footnote 1 at p. 98.
19641
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
of carrying passengers. The case of Lemieux v. Bedard which was
also of direct authority carried this line of reasoning even further.
There, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a motor car can in
certain circumstances be operated in the business of carrying pass-
engers for compensation even if it is so operated only for one day
or on only one occasion. 12 It is perhaps dangerous to say categori-
cally that the court could not have decided the case otherwise, but
at least on the authorities, a contrary decision would have been
difficult. Basically, the case is wholly consistent with a considerable
body of jurisprudence. Its prime importance would seem to lie in the
fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has lent its weight to the
Ontario judiciary and their fight against section 105.
Judicial legislation with regard to the section began in 1945
with Harrison v. Toronto Motor Car and Krug'3 and has followed two
main streams. The first as evidenced by the Krug case has been
to discover alternate relationships between the owner or driver and
the passenger. The second as evidenced by the instant case has been
to give a broad construction to the "exception within an exception"
of subsection 105(2). However, the Supreme Court of Canada has
not always proved itself to be sympathetic with these attempts to
delimit the scope of the subsection. Thus in Hanley v. Alkardyce,14
the Court clearly overruled a previous line of cases whereby an
"owner-passenger" of a motor vehicle who was being driven by
another person was allowed recovery.' 5 Although this was a nakedly
overt distortion which no doubt had to be remedied, nonetheless, it
is both salutary and gratifying to note that the Supreme Court has
not embarked on a totally literal interpretation of the statute.
Less clear is the resultant law following the Court's disapproval
of Csehi v. Dixon. Certainly, there can be no disagreement with their
conclusion, that once it is ascertained that the arrangement is of a
"commercial nature", the manner of computing the tariff is irrele-
vant. Nonetheless, considerable doubt is thus cast upon the decision
in Shaw v. McNay.16 That case is not authority for the commonly held
proposition that there is no liability where there is merely an
expense-sharing arrangement motivated primarily by friendship.17
Indeed, the parties were complete strangers. More apposite is the
statement in the headnote that a vehicle operated in the business
of carrying passengers for compensation does not include a vehicle
in which the owner, on an isolated occasion, carries a passenger who
n Supra, footnote 5 at p. 898.'2 Supra, footnote 8, at p. 842 per Pickup C.J.O.
13 [1945] O.R. 1, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 286.
3-4 (1962) 37 W.W.R. 29, (1962) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 358 (S.C.C.).
15Recovery was allowed in Cote v. Gauvreau (1960) 31 W.W.R. 425
(Alta.) and in Koos v. McVey [1937] O.R. 369, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 496.
16 [1939] O.R. 368.
17 See Linden, A. M., Comment on Dorosz and Dorosz v. Kock [1961] O.R.
442 (Schatz J.), affd., [19621 O.R. 105, (1962) 31 D.L.R. (2d) 139 (Ont. C.A.)
in 40 Can. Bar Rev. 284 at p. 290.
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pays a portion of the expense of the operation of the vehicle.' 8 If
such be the true ratio decidendi,' 9 then it certainly cannot stand
with the 'frequency test' enunciated in Lemieux v. Bedard. Nor is the
writer capable of grasping the impossibly subtle distinction between
an expense-sharing arrangement and an arrangement intended to
cover a portion of a reasonable estimate of the cost of gasoline and
oil used, as existed in Csehi v. Dixon. With all due respect, it is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not deign to consider the
cases cited to them. This failure has certainly produced once obvious
inconsistency in the law, namely the conflict between Shaw v. McNay
and Lemieux v. Bedard, and a golden opportunity to clear some
muddy water has been lost. Apart from the decided cases, the
distinction between an expense-sharing agreement and a commercial
venture is logically untenable. Clearly the word compensation in
subsection 105(2) implies consideration. It is simple contract law
that adequacy of consideration is of no moment. A practical dilemma
of this conflict and one of great concern to numerous people is the
legal status of the "car pool".20 As the law stands, if a venture is of
a commercial nature, one trip can give rise to liability3' If the
stated fee is a fixed amount, the driver will be liable,2 and as a
result of the present case, once in the commercial category, the
manner of computation is irrelevant. In conclusion, this writer sub-
mits that the driver in a car pool is no longer free from legal liability
to his passenger if any money is received at any time.23 The pertinent
question in this regard is-what meaning have the courts given to
"commercial". 24 Unfortunately all the decisions seem to have been
strictly 'ad hoc' with little or no consideration given to policy or
legal formulation. 25 This is doubly regrettable as the word has become
a guise for many varied ventures and should be defined in at least
a rudimentary fashion.
As stated previously, the line of reasoning adopted by the Court
was that of giving the so called "exception within an exception" of
subsection 105(2) a broad interpretation. The inherent difficulty
Is This conclusion is supported by the statement of Godfrey . at pp.
371-372.
19 Note also Horsley, Manual of Motor Vehicle Law at p. 292 for a
similar view.
20For a good discussion of the cases on this subject see Linden, A. M.,
comment on Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. and Matthews [1962] O.R.
476 (Ont. H.C.), in (1963) 41 Can. Bar Rev. 593 at pages 594-595.
21 Lemieux v. Bedard, supra, footnote 8.
22 See Regan 'v. EdgilZ [1956] O.W.N. 801, Chote 'v. Rowan [1943] 1 D.L.R.
339, and Dunnigan v. Gareau [1954] O.W.N. 897.
23 This conclusion is somewhat supported by Horsley, supra, footnote 19
at p. 294: "The exception was not limited to cases where the car was being
exclusively used in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, and
when an owner carries passengers to and from work daily for a fixed weekly
fee, such passengers have a right of action".
24 Note that Phelan, Highway Traffic Law, does not even consider the
matter.
25Note Dunnigan 'v. Gareau [1954] O.W.N. 504; Demianiw v. Zinkcewich,
[1953] O.W.N. 121 (Co. Ct. J., Alta.); Smith v. Steeves, (1958) 41 M.P.R. 91
(N.B.C.A.).
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of such a construction lies in the fact that there is a statutory condi-
tion in all insurance policies prohibiting recovery if the insured
operates his vehicle in the business of carrying passengers for compen-
sation.26 A far more reliable and preferable approach, at least from
the insured's point of view, is to discover an alternate relationship
between passenger and driver. Thus in Harrison v. Toronto Motor
Car and Krug27 the decision rested on the law of vicarious liability
as between the master and the driver,28 despite the fact that some
cases point to the view that the relationship of master and servant
must exist between the plaintiff and the driver.29 In Dorosz and
Dorosz v. Kock,30 both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal im-
posed liability on the basis of a "private contract" of employment
which included a term requiring safe carriage.3 ' Neither of these
two relationships existed in Ouelette v. Joknson. With regard to
vicarious liability, the defendant was himself the driver-owner and
not the master-owner as exemplified by the Krug case. As to the
Dorosz case, it is patently impossible to discover any private contract
of employment between the parties. Nor could the court have relied
on Duchaine v. Armstrong32 as expanded in the Dorosz case whereby
a master may be responsible for the safe carriage of his employment.33
It should be noted that the present decision in no way impugns the
'contract of carriage' view as enunciated in the Duchaine case. In
conclusion, the Court adopted the only possible line of reasoning
enabling it to circumvent the subsection short of an absolute denial
of its existence and validity.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the law in this area is
uncertain. Nevertheless, there are numerous pitfalls waiting to catch
the unwary plaintiff. The enactment of the "gratuitous passenger"
subsection seems to have been largely motivated by a very strong
insurance lobby.34 Quite definitely it has no historical rationale. The
essence of the enactment is to relieve the person at fault from
liability, whereas historically, fault was the implicit premise of
negligence. Possibly the subsection is a legislative example of "volenti
non fit injuria", but this contention is weakened by the fact that a
26 R.S.O. 1960 c. 190, s. 203, condition 3(b) "unless permission is expressly
given by an endorsement of the policy and in consideration of an additional
stated premium, the automobile shall not be rented or leased, nor shall It be
used as a taxicab, public omnibus, livery, jitney, or sight-seeing conveyance or
for carrying passengers for compensation".
2 7 Supra, footnote 13.
28 See Morton, Comment on Duchaine v. Armstrong [1957] O.W.N. 251 in
(1958) 36 Can. Bar Rev. 414 at pp. 416-417.29 Jurasits v. Names [1957] O.W.N. 166, (1957) 8 D.L.R. (2d) 659 (Ont.
C.A.).
30 [1961] O.R. 442 (Schatz J.) affd., [1962] O.R. 105, (1962) 31 D.L.R. (2d)
139 (Ont. C.A.).
31 Supra, footnote 30 at p. 443.
32 [1957] O.W.N. 251.
33 Supra, footnote 30 at p. 444.
34 See Wright, Comment on Harrison v. Toronto Motor Car and Kirug in
(1948) 23 Can. Bar Rev. 344 at p. 347.
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person may not be able to consent to negligence in the abstract.35
As stated, when the subsection was promulgated, fault liability consti-
tuted the foundation of the law of torts and insurance coverage was
less wide spread. But these factors are no longer operative. As a
matter of policy, fault liability should be of no account.
36
First, it is the writer's thesis that the aim of the law in penalizing fault
should be clearly and finally separated from the aim of compensating
victims. Fault should be relegated entirely to the criminal law, where
it properly belongs, and the community as a whole should ensure that
victims of accidents are compensated whether or not a particular indi-
vidual can be proved at fault. So long as the ideas of fault and of
compensation are linked in our civil law of torts, we shall fail to
achieve either aim of the law. Historically, fault first developed as a
concept in the criminal law, and it was only later that it was taken
over into the civil law as a tortious concept governing compensation to
the victim of a wrong.37
As a matter of practice, fault has become a meaningless concept when
the smallest error in judgment can result in a law suit of astronomic
proportions.38 Secondly, third party liability insurance is now of
almost universal incidence. 39 The last step remaining is to make such
coverage compulsory.40 There can be no doubt that this is a social
necessity.4 ' Thus, the occasion of loss-spreading has become virtually
so complete than any legislative anomalies should be eradicated. The
courts in general have shown their abhorrence of the "gratuitous
passenger" clause and the public is definitely uneasy about its opera-
tion. Undoubtedly, the legislature would be well advised both on legal
and political grounds to abolish subsection 105(2). A.R.A.S.
Burke v. Perry and Perry, [1963] S.C.R. 329.
This case in which the Supreme Court of Canada reverses the
Manitoba Court of Appeal and restores the judgment of the trial
judge is an illustration of Jerome Frank's thesis that the essential
jurisprudence is to be found in the trial courts and not in the higher
35 See Dann v. Hamilton [1939] 1 N.B. 509. The mere fact that a motorist
is receiving a gratuitous benefit from the driver does not mean that he thereby
consents to run the risk of suffering injury caused by the driver's negligence
and to forego compensation.
36 See Friedmann, Social Insurance and Principles of Tort Liability (1949)
Harv. L. Rev. 241.
37 Harris, D. R., Oompensation for Accidents, (1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960)
Solicitors' Journal, p. 1.
38 Note here the so called "thin skull" cases.
39 The figures here are conflicting, but it can be assumed that there is
now 97-99% coverage.
40 In Saskatchewan, a scheme not based on fault has been in force since
1946; it is administered on a non-profit basis, by a Crown corporation, the
Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office.41See Accident Facts, 1962: Statistics Relating to Motor Vehicle Traffic
Accidents, Ontario Department of Transport. In 1962, 1,383 persons were killed
in Ontario. If 2% of all motorists were uninsured this would mean that 27
persons were possibly left without any remedy whatsoever.
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